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CHILD PROTECTION LAW—CARE AND PROTECTION
OF WALT: REEXAMINING THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL
AUTHORITY IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE REASONABLE
EFFORTS REQUIREMENT
Tara Morrison
When the state removes a child from the custody of his or her parents,
the delicate balance between parents’ rights and the state’s obligation to
protect the child comes into play. Because termination of parental rights
is irrevocable, it is often referred to as the “death penalty” of family law.
Historically, parents with intellectual disabilities have been denied the
opportunity to parent through eugenics and sterilization, a horrific
history that finds modern articulation through the removal of children
from parents based on presumptions of neglect.1 When a child protection
agency removes a child from parental care, without providing the
support services to remedy the stated reason for removal, the parents are
denied an adequate opportunity to parent their own children and the
family suffers. In 2017, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
decided Care and Protection of Walt, which held that if the Department
of Children and Families (DCF) breaches its statutory duty to provide
support services prior to removing a child, then the juvenile judge has
the equitable authority to order remedial action. This Note discusses
what Walt tells us about how and when judicial authority may be
exercised in care and protection cases in Massachusetts, and what
impact this may have on parental rights, specifically the rights of parents
with intellectual disabilities.

INTRODUCTION
The right to parent one’s own child is a constitutionally protected
private interest and therefore no state interference is permitted without due

1. Tim Booth & Wendy Booth, Parenting with Learning Difficulties: Lessons for
Practitioners, 23 BRIT. J. SOC. WORK 459, 463 (1993).
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process of law.2 However, under the doctrine of parens patriae3 the state
may take custody of children who are considered to be experiencing, or at
imminent risk of experiencing, abuse or neglect.4 During the 1970s, the
number of children in foster care in the United States ballooned from
approximately 8,000 to 100,000,5 and one response to this increase was to
refocus state efforts on reunification of the family by providing increased
funding for support services.6 This shift also recognized that prolonged
placement in a foster home can have a profoundly negative impact on
children.7
In an attempt to focus efforts on keeping children in their homes, the
federal government implemented the Adoption Assistance and Child
Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA), which encouraged a shift away from
child removal and toward providing alternative services to families.8
Among other requirements, the AACWA includes a “reasonable efforts
requirement,”9 which mandates that in order to receive certain federal
funding for foster care, states must alter their statutory schemes to include
a requirement that child protection agencies make efforts to reunify the
family.10 This requirement is meant to protect parents and children from
2. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); In re Hilary, 880 N.E.2d 343, 347–
48 (Mass. 2008); Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. J.K.B., 393 N.E.2d 406, 407–08 (Mass. 1979).
3. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
4. The specifics of the statutory schemes empowering state agencies to remove children
vary from state to state. In Massachusetts, the predominant statutes governing care and
protection proceedings are MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 119 (2019) and MASS GEN. LAWS. ch. 210
(2019).
5. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 103D CONG., OVERVIEW OF
ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS: 1994 GREEN BOOK, H.R. Doc. No. 103-27, at 639 tbl.14-14 (1994).
6. See S. REP. NO. 96-336, at 3–4 (1979), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1448, 1452–
53.
7. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST
DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE 19–20, 90 (1996); CAROLE A. MCKELVEY & JOELLEN STEVENS,
ADOPTION CRISIS: THE TRUTH BEHIND ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE 36–37 (1994); Paul Fine,
Clinical Aspects of Foster Care, in FOSTER CARE: CURRENT ISSUES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES
206, 206–08 (Martha J. Cox & Roger D. Cox eds., 1985); Shawn L. Raymond, Where Are the
Reasonable Efforts to Enforce the Reasonable Efforts Requirement?: Monitoring State
Compliance Under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 77 TEX. L. REV.
1235, 1236 n.5 (1999).
8. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (1980)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The provision of the reasonable efforts
requirement was preserved when Congress enacted the Adoption and Safe Families Act in 1997.
See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (2009).
9. This requirement will be referred to throughout this Note as the “reasonable efforts
requirement.”
10. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 671(a)(1), (a)(15)(B) (2019) (“[R]easonable effort shall be made to
preserve and reunify families (i) prior to the placement of a child in foster care, to prevent or
eliminate the need for removing the child from the child’s home; and (ii) to make it possible for
a child to safely return to the child’s home . . . .”).
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avoidable removal and prolonged separation.11 Congress adjusted the
requirement through the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997
(ASFA),12 which allows for child welfare agencies to remove children
from their homes without first taking reasonable efforts to prevent the
removal in circumstances where the child is living in a highly dangerous
home.13
While the reasonable efforts requirement has been included in the
Massachusetts child welfare statute,14 there is very little federal guidance
about what exactly the state must do to satisfy the requirement.15
Therefore, the requirement has gone largely unenforced.16 This lack of
11. Karoline S. Homer, Program Abuse in Foster Care: A Search for Solutions, 1 VA. J.
SOC. POL’Y & L. 177, 180 (1993).
12. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
13. Id. Section 671(a)(15)(D) amended the ASFA by adding exceptions to the reasonable
efforts requirement: reasonable efforts need not be made prior to removal of a child or to reunify
the child with their parent if
the parent has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances (as defined in State
law, which definition may include but need not be limited to abandonment, torture,
chronic abuse, and sexual abuse); the parent has committed murder . . . of another
child of the parent; committed voluntary manslaughter . . . of another child of the
parent; aided or abetted, attempted, conspired, or solicited to commit such murder
or such a voluntary manslaughter; or committed a felony assault that results in
serious bodily injury to the child or another child of the parent . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i)–(ii) (2019).
14. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 119, §§ 24, 29C (2019). In codifying 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)
into state law, Massachusetts included the requirement that once a child has been removed, the
judge “shall determine not less than annually whether the department or its agent has made
reasonable efforts to make it possible for the child to return safely to his parent or guardian,”
which established a timeline for judicial determination of whether reunification efforts are being
made once the child has been placed in the custody of DCF. Id. Additionally, Massachusetts
has included the reasonable efforts obligation in the factors that the court must consider when
deciding to terminate parental rights. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 3(b) (2019).
15. Cristine H. Kim, Putting Reason Back into the Reasonable Efforts Requirement in
Child Abuse and Neglect Cases, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 287, 299 (“While the HHS regulations
require that each state designate in a plan which preventive and reunification services are
available, no state is required to provide any specific services.” (footnote omitted)); see Will L.
Crossley, Defining Reasonable Efforts: Demystifying the State’s Burden Under Federal Child
Protection Legislation, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 259, 313 (2003). “In short, while the law outlines
when states do not have to undertake reasonable efforts, it does not articulate a definition of the
types of reasonable efforts state child welfare officials should undertake and state youth court
judges should consider in the judicial determination process.” Raymond, supra note 7, at 1260.
“In effect, inaction on the part of [Health and Human Services] [to define reasonable efforts]
has created a situation in which the federal government’s foster care ‘contract’ with states
amounts to only empty ‘conditions.’” Id. at 1262.
16. See Jeanne M. Kaiser, Finding a Reasonable Way to Enforce the Reasonable Efforts
Requirement in Child Protection Cases, 7 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 100, 111 (2009)
(“Massachusetts serves as one example of a state in which judicial enforcement of the
reasonable efforts requirement has been forgiving of uninspired state efforts. . . . Massachusetts
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enforcement is extremely harmful to families living in poverty, parents
who are drug addicted, and parents with intellectual disabilities, for
example, because concerns about their ability to provide adequate care
could potentially be alleviated by support services from the Department
of Children and Families (DCF or the Department).17 Without meaningful
enforcement of the reasonable efforts requirement, there is no guarantee
that these parents will receive services from DCF that could be essential
to reunification, such as the support of a parent aide, home-making
services, and sufficient visitation time. At several stages of a care and
protection litigation, the court must determine whether or not DCF has
taken reasonable efforts to provide supportive services. However, the
level of deference to be afforded to the state agency in determining
whether reasonable efforts were made, as well as the scope of the court’s
authority to order services when DCF has failed to meet their reasonable
efforts obligation, remains unclear.18
In 2017, Care and Protection of Walt addressed these very issues.19
In Walt, the child was removed from the home due to allegations of
neglect based on DCF’s concerns about the cleanliness of the home and
the parents’ suspected use of marijuana around the child.20 The trial judge
approved the emergency removal at the initial hearing and transferred
permanent custody to DCF at the temporary custody hearing.21 The father
then petitioned for interlocutory relief, and eventually the case made its
way in front of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC).22 The
court concluded that a juvenile judge has the authority to order DCF “to

appellate courts have set the bar for complying with the reasonable efforts requirement quite
low . . . .”).
17. Infra Section I.
18. See Ann Balmelli O’Connor, Care and Protection of Walt: Breathing New Life Into
the Decades-Old Policy of Foster Care as a Last Resort, 62 BOS. B.J. 24, 24 (2018).
19. See Care & Prot. of Walt, 84 N.E.3d 803 (Mass. 2017).
20. Id. at 807–08.
21. Id. at 810.
22. After the father petitioned for interlocutory relief, the petition went to a single justice
of the Appeals Court, who found that “[t]he [d]epartment did not make reasonable efforts to
eliminate the need for removal prior to removing [Walt]; rather, it summarily removed the child
from the premises.” Id. (alterations in original). In addition to remanding the case for a further
hearing on what reasonable efforts DCF would provide to eliminate the need for removal, the
court also ordered specific services be provided to the family, including daily visitation,
inclusion in the child’s special education meetings, and assistance with finding alternative
housing. Id. at 810–11. The single justice reported his order to a panel of the Appeals Court
and the SJC transferred the case on its own motion. Id. at 811.
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take reasonable remedial steps to diminish the adverse consequences of
its breach of duty.”23
This Note addresses how Walt impacted the availability of
enforcement of the reasonable efforts requirement, particularly focusing
on parents with intellectual disabilities as a case study for the crucial
importance of this statutory obligation. Part I examines the current
protections in place for parents and the lack of an effective remedy for
parents who are not receiving the services to which they are entitled under
both state law and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).24 This
deprivation of parental rights is a serious concern under Massachusetts
law because children can be removed on account of a parent’s disability
despite the fact that there is no meaningful remedy for a parent whose
disability is not being accounted for in the services provided. Part II
explains how two Massachusetts cases previously established the extent
of judicial authority to interfere with decisions made by DCF and
examines those cases in detail to better understand judicial deference in
the context of child protection law in Massachusetts.
Part III argues that Walt can be read to expand the authority of
juvenile judges to intervene when DCF has failed to make reasonable
efforts towards reunification, including reasonable accommodations for
parents with disabilities. In conclusion, this Note explores how this
reading would provide a necessary check on DCF’s power to define its
own statutory obligation—a necessary protection for parents with
disabilities.
I.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE REASONABLE EFFORTS REQUIREMENT IN
BALANCING THE PROTECTION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AND THE
PROTECTION OF CHILDREN

Child protective agencies were originally created to provide safety
and protection for children experiencing abuse or neglect.25 The federal
23. Id. at 817 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 218, § 59, for the Juvenile Court’s equitable
jurisdiction in all cases and matters arising under MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119).
24. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2009). Title II of the
ADA prohibits discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities in all programs,
activities, and services provided by public entities. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2018). The ADA was
amended in 2008 to “restore the intent and protections of the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990,” an amendment that substantially redefined the definition of disability. See ADA
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-325, 112 Stat. 3553 (2008).
25. The world’s first organization devoted entirely to child protection was the New York
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, established in 1875. John E.B. Meyers, A
Short History of Child Protection in America, 42 FAM. L.Q. 449, 449 (2008). Henry Bergh,
founder of the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, and his attorney,
Elbridge Gerry, established the organization when Etta Wheeler, who was desperate to find a
legal mechanism to protect a young girl who she knew was being routinely beaten, contacted
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and state statutes that govern care and protection proceedings attempt to
balance the interests of parents and the interests of the state, a challenging
task as these protected interests can sometimes be in conflict.26 While the
Supreme Court has recognized that parents have a constitutionally
protected interest in retaining custody of their children,27 the state also has
the parens patriae power to protect the welfare and safety of children and
to promote their best interests.28 While leniency in child removal cases
may result in catastrophic tragedy, an over-zealous approach means that
children who could have safely lived with their parents are placed in foster
care and potentially adopted, unjustly denying the rights of both children
and parents to live together as a family.29 Studies show that for children,
the experience of being removed from their family can be intensely
traumatic, and the effects of removal can be lifelong.30
With these concerns in mind, federal and state legislatures have
implemented a reunification-promoting policy in the form of the
reasonable efforts requirement.31 This requirement, in essence, is meant
to establish that DCF will first and foremost try to put energy and
resources into keeping families together.
The goal of the
Commonwealth—to support families and to avoid child removal unless
absolutely necessary—is articulated in the Massachusetts child-welfare
statute policy declaration, which states that the Commonwealth will:
direct its efforts, first, to the strengthening and encouragement of
family life for the care and protection of children; to assist and
encourage the use by any family of all available resources to this end;
and to provide substitute care of children only when the family itself

them seeking help saving the child. Id. at 451–52. By 1922, there were over three hundred
child protective agencies throughout the country, but throughout the twentieth century, many
cities and rural areas alike had no access to child protection services. Id. at 452.
26. See Michele N. Jabour, The Termination of Parental Rights by Massachusetts Courts,
23 NEW ENG. L. REV. 547, 548 (1988); see also Toby Solomon & James B. Boskey, In Whose
Best Interests: Child v. Parent, 1993 N.J. LAW. 36, 36 (“Protecting the child’s interest is more
difficult in cases where the parent’s interests are at odds with the child’s. The clearest example
of this arises in cases of termination of parental rights . . . .”).
27. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (finding that parents have essential rights
to conceive and raise children).
28. Jabour, supra note 26, at 550; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
29. See Michelle Goldberg, Has Child Protective Services Gone Too Far?, THE NATION
(Sept. 30, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/has-child-protective-services-gone-too-far/
[https://perma.cc/Y7EG-8DS4] (highlighting the discrepancies within the child welfare system
between white middle class parents, poor parents, and parents of color when it comes to
monitoring and intervention by child services).
30. Delilah Bruskas, Children in Foster Care: A Vulnerable Population at Risk, 21 J.
CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC NURSING 70, 70–71 (2008).
31. Supra notes 8, 10, 13 and accompanying text.
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or the resources available to the family are unable to provide the
necessary care and protection to insure the rights of any child to sound
health and normal physical, mental, spiritual and moral
development.32

The reasonable efforts requirement is a mechanism for ensuring that
children are not removed from the care of their parents when the
circumstances that caused the agency to investigate the family could be
alleviated by providing services to the parents.33 In this way, parents are
not robbed of the opportunity to parent their children in a safe and healthy
environment and are provided the resources they need to care for their
family.34
A. Procedural Due Process and Care and Protection in Massachusetts
Understanding where the reasonable efforts requirement comes into
play in a care and protection proceeding requires a bit of background into
how this particular area of litigation operates. Care and protection
proceedings fall under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, and
throughout the litigation process—from the moment a report of neglect or
abuse is filed to the termination of parental rights (TPR) hearing—there
are procedural safeguards to which DCF must adhere.35 These safeguards
exist because, as a state agency potentially depriving citizens of a
protected interest, there are significant due process concerns as soon as a

32. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 1 (2019).
33. See Amelia S. Watson, A New Focus on Reasonable Efforts to Reunify, ABA (Sept. 1,
2012),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/child_law/resources/child_law_practiceonline/
child_law_practice/vol_31/september_2012/a_new_focus_on_reasonableeffortstoreunify/
[https://perma.cc/LV7D-BGT7]. This article emphasizes how there is a new focus on
enforceability of the reasonable efforts requirement in the wake of the current economic climate
and defines reasonable efforts enforcement as ensuring “states offer preventative and
rehabilitative services to parents involved with the child welfare agency.” Id. “The question is
pronounced since child welfare cases typically involve poor parents and families who cannot
afford services without state agency support.” Id. (footnote omitted).
34. Mical Raz, Family Separation Doesn’t Just Happen at the Border: Poor Families,
Too, Are Torn Apart by Policy that Favors Separation Over Aid, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2019,
6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/01/30/family-separation-doesntjust-happen-border/ [https://perma.cc/5VK6-C6NS] (“Rather than providing struggling families
with the resources they need to make both parents[’] and children’s lives safer, family separation
is all too often the penalty parents pay for poverty, addiction or disability.”).
35. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 29C (2019); see Leonard P. Edwards, Judicial Oversight
of Parental Visitation in Family Reunification Cases, 54 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 1, 2 (2003).
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51A report36 is filed.37 The SJC’s “decisions, and those of the United
States Supreme Court, leave no doubt that ‘[t]he rights to conceive and to
raise one’s children’ are ‘essential . . . basic civil rights of man . . . far
more precious . . . than property rights.’”38 Parents and children have a
right to be together and to be afforded the procedural due process
guarantees associated with that right.39
In Massachusetts, every care and protection proceeding begins with
a report of abuse or neglect, which then triggers an investigation of the
family by DCF. Once the DCF investigator substantiates the report of
abuse or neglect, there are two ways in which a child can come into the
custody of DCF: either a temporary custody hearing is scheduled or the
child is taken into emergency custody, and a temporary custody hearing
is scheduled. DCF is permitted to take emergency custody of a child if
the DCF investigator finds that the child is currently experiencing abuse
or neglect or is at imminent risk of abuse or neglect and the removal of
the child is deemed necessary to protect the safety of the child.40 First, the
DCF worker must make a written report stating the reasons for removal
and file a care and protection petition on the next court day.41 Next, the
judge must find at an ex parte hearing that DCF had reasonable cause to
believe that the child is suffering from serious abuse or neglect, or is in
immediate danger of such, and that immediate removal is necessary to
protect the child from abuse or neglect.42 Only then may the court issue
an emergency order transferring the child into the custody of DCF for up

36. A 51A report is a report filed against a parent or guardian when there is a suspicion of
abuse or neglect. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 51A (2019). The 51A report is often the first
contact a family will have with DCF. After receiving a 51A report, the Department “shall
investigate the suspected child abuse or neglect, provide a written evaluation . . . and make a
written determination relative to the safety of and risk posed to the child and whether the
suspected child abuse or neglect is substantiated.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 51B(a) (2019).
37. Care & Prot. of Erin, 823 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Mass. 2005) (“Due process requirements
must be met where a parent is deprived of the right to raise his or her child.” (citation omitted));
Raymond C. O’Brien, Reasonable Efforts and Parent-Child Reunification, 2013 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 1029, 1032 (“[U]nless the parent consents to termination of parental rights, the parent
retains a right under the United States Constitution to the custody of his or her child. This right
is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and is a fundamental right.”).
See generally Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650–51 (1972) (discussing the right of parents
to raise their children).
38. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. J.K.B., 393 N.E. 2d 406, 407 (Mass. 1979) (quoting Stanley,
405 U.S. at 651).
39. See In re Hilary, 880 N.E.2d 343, 347–48 (Mass. 2008) (“[P]arents have a
fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their children.”).
40. 110 MASS. CODE REGS. 4.29 (2019).
41. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 51B(c) (2019).
42. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 24 (2019).
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to seventy-two hours.43 In Massachusetts, indigent parents are provided
with an attorney and are entitled to a temporary custody hearing,
commonly referred to as a “seventy-two hour hearing,” where they may
present their case.44
When there is no emergency removal, the case first goes to court at
the temporary custody hearing. At the temporary custody hearing, the
juvenile judge must decide whether continuation in DCF’s custody is in
the best interest of the child, and whether DCF made reasonable efforts to
prevent the necessity of removal.45 Once the child is placed in DCF
custody, DCF then has a statutory obligation to make reasonable efforts
“to make it possible for the child to return safely to his parent or
guardian”46 in the form of a service plan for the family.47 Once the child
is in the permanent custody of DCF, the parties must routinely return to
court throughout the duration of the case, and the judge must decide no
less than annually whether reasonable efforts have been made by the DCF
to reunify the family.48 The fact that the reasonable efforts determination
is made by a judge, rather than being left for DCF to decide independently,
highlights the vital importance that this obligation be honored.
B. The Particular Importance of Enforcing the Reasonable Efforts
Requirement for Parents with Intellectual Disabilities
To illustrate how critical it is that parents receive the support services
towards reunification to which they are entitled, this Part of the Note
focuses on the experience of state intervention for parents with intellectual
disabilities. The issues identified are also extremely relevant to parents
living in poverty or struggling with addiction, and it is clear that judicial
enforcement of the reasonable efforts requirement would directly and
substantially impact the lives of these parents as well. However, a recent
federal investigation into one Massachusetts mother’s case provides a
particularly helpful illustration of how the lack of enforceable reasonable
efforts requirement impacts the lives for parents with intellectual
disabilities, and that is the reasoning behind this Note’s focus on this

43. Id.
44. Id.
45. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 29C (2019).
46. Id.
47. Id.; see also 110 MASS. CODE REGS. 7.001–7.095 (2019). While the DCF regulations
include a litany of subsections addressing various service options for families, the current
regulations are devoid of protocols for how families can access such services, nor any definition
or description of the “service plan” or “action plan” that DCF must provide each family.
48. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 29C (2019).
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particular issue as a case study for the enforcement of the reasonable
efforts requirement.
1.

Sara Gordon

A recent joint investigation of DCF conducted by the Department of
Justice (DOJ) and Department of Health and Human Services (HSS)49
highlights the tragic ramifications of lack of oversight with regards to the
reasonable efforts requirement. Sara Gordon50 prompted the investigation
after spending over two years separated from her infant daughter based on
DCF’s belief that her disabilities made her unfit to parent.51 The findings
of the investigation, documented in the joint report, brought to light the
services available to parents, and the importance of a mechanism to ensure
that those supports are provided.52
Sara was a young Massachusetts mother whose child was removed
from her care just days after she gave birth because a nurse was concerned
that she did not know how to properly care for her child.53 Sara had a
developmental disability that manifested in several ways and caused her
to require “repetition, hands-on instruction, and frequency in order to learn
new things.”54 Over the next two years Sara received “minimum
supports” from DCF, and despite Sara’s continuous pleas for more time
with her daughter, she was able to visit with her only two to four hours
per month.55 Eventually, DCF decided that it would be in the child’s best
49. Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Just., Civ. Rights Div. & U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum.
Servs., Office for Civil Rights, to Erin Deveney, Interim Comm’r, Mass. Dep’t of Children &
Families (Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.ada.gov/ma_docf_lof.pdf [https://perma.cc/AP6R-36DE]
[hereinafter DOJ & HSS Letter]. This joint letter, issued following the Departments’
investigation into alleged disability discrimination by DCF, marks a historic moment in
disability law because it represents the first time that the federal government has officially
interpreted the twenty-five-year-old Americans with Disabilities Act as it applies to the
protection of parental rights. Elizabeth Picciuto, Baby Taken Away Because Mom’s
“Disabled”, DAILY BEAST (Feb. 10, 2015, 5:55 AM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/babytaken-away-because-moms-disabled [https://perma.cc/U54K-73EW]. Robyn Powell, a lawyer
with the National Council on Disability, said about the report, the “DOJ and HHS’s letter is
really significant because it’s the first time they’ve said what we’ve all thought, which is that
the ADA applies to these matters. They are saying, yes, parents have the right to have the
appropriate supports and not have their child removed arbitrarily.” Id.
50. “Sara Gordon” is the pseudonym used by the DOJ and HSS throughout the joint report.
DOJ & HSS Letter, supra note 49, at 1.
51. Id. at 12–13.
52. Id. at 11–12.
53. DOJ & HSS Letter, supra note 49, at 5. The Intake Report indicated that DCF decided
to conduct an emergency response investigation, noting concerns that Sara was “not able to
comprehend how to handle or care for the child due to the [her] mental retardation.” Id. (citing
the 51A report).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 6.
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interest to change the goal from reunification to adoption,56 the step
preceding termination of parental rights.
The report found that DCF had services at its disposal that could have
helped Sara, but DCF failed to provide them.57 The report also concluded
that DCF’s failure to provide these services violated Title II of the ADA.58
This violation denied Sara access to existing family resources and in-home
parenting services. Moreover, the report states that DCF administered its
program in a way that had the “purpose or effect of defeating or
substantially impairing accomplishment of the reunification program
objectives with respect to Ms. Gordon.”59 Sara and her daughter were
reunited following this investigation,60 but had the DOJ and HSS not
become involved in Sara’s case, it is highly likely that her parental rights
would have been terminated. Sadly, Sara is certainly not alone in her
experience, as parents with intellectual disabilities routinely experience
this kind of disability discrimination at alarming rates.
2.

The High Risk of Termination of Parental Rights for Parents
with Intellectual Disabilities

For parents with intellectual disabilities, there are several factors that
increase the likelihood that DCF will remove their child and terminate
their parental rights.61 First, cases where children are removed due to fear
that the parent lacks the ability to care for the child tend to involve actual
or potential neglect rather than abuse.62 Following the definition of
neglect,63 this means that in order to alleviate the precipitating condition,
56. Id. at 12.
57. Id. at 14.
58. Id. at 12.
59. Id. at 17.
60. Susan Donaldson James, “We Can Keep Her”: Disabled Mom Wins Daughter Back
After Legal Battle, TODAY (Mar. 13, 2015, 3:59 PM), https://www.today.com/parents/disabledmom-gets-daughter-back-after-legal-battle-t8511 [https://perma.cc/3KVA-3S5C].
61. See Jude T. Pannell, Unaccommodated: Parents with Mental Disabilities in Iowa’s
Child Welfare System and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 1165, 1171
(2011); Rachel N. Shute, Disabling the Presumption of Unfitness: Utilizing the Americans with
Disabilities Act to Equally Protect Massachusetts Parents Facing Termination of Their
Parental Rights, 50 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 493, 494 (2017) (“The stigma surrounding mental
illness blinds many who are involved with the care and protection of children, making parents
with disabilities more likely to become involved with the child welfare system and face
termination of their parental rights.”).
62. Maurice A. Feldman, Parents with Intellectual Disabilities: Implications and
Interventions, in HANDBOOK OF CHILD ABUSE RESEARCH AND TREATMENT 401, 401 (John R.
Lutzker ed., 1998).
63. According to DCF regulations, neglect is defined as:
failure by a caretaker, either deliberately or through negligence or inability, to take
those actions necessary to provide a child with minimally adequate food, clothing,
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the parents must obtain new skills, rather than desist an abusive
behavior.64 The success of these parents becomes highly dependent on the
availability of services because of the requirement that they have new skill
development.65 Unfortunately, parents with disabilities are less likely to
have access to these very services because they are more apt to be living
in poverty than parents without disabilities.66 Additionally, parents with
disabilities are more likely to receive state services, meaning they are
subject to frequent monitoring by professionals who are mandated
reporters, increasing their likelihood of referral to DCF.67 High rates of
referral to DCF are also the result of presumptions about the aptitude of
parents with disabilities to provide adequate care.68 Parents with
disabilities are often referred to child welfare services and, once involved,
experience permanent separation at a much higher rate than the general
population.69 Additionally, the “relative lack of appropriate family
shelter, medical care, supervision, emotional stability and growth, or other
essential care; provided, however, that such inability is not due solely to inadequate
economic resources or solely to the existence of a handicapping condition.
110 MASS. CODE REGS. 2.00 (2019). The very decision to remove the child from Sara’s care
on account of her disabilities went against DCF regulations, as the concerns arose directly from
her disability, or “handicapping condition.” DOJ & HSS Letter, supra note 49, at 2, 23–24
(noting that in Massachusetts DCF has no procedures for social workers to implement or
understand how this portion of the regulations applies to their obligations to families in order to
avoid discrimination).
64. The definition of abuse according to DCF regulations is “the non-accidental
commission of any act by a caretaker upon a child under age 18 which causes, or creates a
substantial risk of physical or emotional injury, or constitutes a sexual offense under the laws
of the Commonwealth or any sexual contact between a caretaker and a child under the care of
that individual,” while the definition of neglect is the “failure by a caretaker, either deliberately
or through negligence or inability, to take those actions necessary to provide a child with
minimally adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical care, supervision, emotional stability and
growth, or other essential care . . . .” 110 MASS. CODE REGS. 2.00 (2019).
65. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, ROCKING THE CRADLE: ENSURING THE RIGHTS OF
PARENTS WITH DISABILITIES AND THEIR CHILDREN 193–215 (2012) [hereinafter ROCKING THE
CRADLE],
https://www.ncd.gov/sites/default/files/Documents/NCD_Parenting_508_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E7NA-GHJB].
66. Rhoda Olkin et al., Comparison of Parents with and Without Disabilities Raising
Teens: Information from the NHIS and Two National Surveys, 51 REHABILITATION PSYCHOL.
43, 44 (2006).
67. MARTHA A. FIELD & VALERIE A. SANCHEZ, EQUAL TREATMENT FOR PEOPLE WITH
MENTAL RETARDATION: HAVING AND RAISING CHILDREN 20 (1999); Susan Kerr, The
Application of the Americans with Disabilities Act to the Termination of the Parental Rights of
Individuals with Mental Disabilities, 16 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 387, 402 (2000).
68. Michael J. Gassner, In Search of a Friend: Custody Hearings and the Disabled Parent,
5 JUV. L. 35, 35–36 (1981) (“The probability of a poor decision is exacerbated when the
stigmatizing ‘disability’ of a parent is inserted into the facts.”).
69. ROCKING THE CRADLE, supra note 65, at 14, 18; PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF
PARENTS AND PROSPECTIVE PARENTS WITH DISABILITIES: TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR
STATE AND LOCAL CHILD WELFARE AGENCIES AND COURTS UNDER TITLE II OF THE
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services to address the needs of parents with disabilities and their children,
and the short time frames of child protection proceedings . . . make these
cases relatively likely to go to court and end in termination of parental
rights.”70 Massachusetts is one of the thirty-seven states that actually
allows for parents to be found permanently unfit to care for their children
on account of their disabilities.71 Nationally, removal rates for parents
with intellectual disabilities are as high as eighty percent.72 For parents
with disabilities in Massachusetts, the DCF rules and regulations have
incorporated the ADA requirements by stating that the agency must
provide adequate accommodations to parents with disabilities.73 The
ADA74 and the Rehabilitation Act75 also both include “a prohibition on
making child custody decisions on the basis of generalized assumptions
about disability, relegating parents with disabilities to lesser services and
opportunities, imposing over protective or unnecessarily restrictive rules,
and failing to reasonably modify policies, practices and procedures.”76 In
Sara Gordon’s case, the DOJ and HSS applied the Americans with
Disabilities Act to the lack of implication of services by DCF.77 The two
agencies found that DCF failed to make reasonable efforts by not
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT,
https://www.ada.gov/doj_hhs_ta/child_welfare_ta.html [https://perma.cc/RMK9-GEZN].
70. Joshua B. Kay, Child Welfare Cases Involving Parents with Disabilities, ST. BAR OF
MICH.: DISABILITIES PROJECT NEWSL (Sept. 2013), https://www.michbar.org/
programs/disabilitynews/disabilities_news_28 [https://perma.cc/U58A-XGJT].
See also
Theresa Glennon, Walking with Them: Advocating for Parents with Mental Illness in the Child
Welfare System, 12 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 273, 291 (2003); Robert L. Hayman, Jr.,
Presumptions of Justice: Law, Politics, and the Mentally Retarded Parent, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1201, 1211 (1990).
71. Joan Vennochi, Disability Does Not Preclude Parental Rights, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 12,
2015, 1:25 PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2015/02/12/disability-does-notpreclude-parenthood/KGVyJ13ten3LcSN7YVXTaM/story.html
[https://perma.cc/X7ZPK3ML].
72. Id.; Ella Callow et al., Parents with Disabilities in the United States: Prevalence,
Perspectives, and a Proposal for Legislative Change to Protect the Right to Family in the
Disability Community, 17 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 9, 15 (2011).
73. 110 MASS. CODE REGS. 1.08 (2019).
The Department recognizes the special needs or handicapped clients. The
Department shall make reasonable accommodations to ensure that its services,
facilities, communications, and meetings are accessible to all handicapped
persons. . . . The Department shall be responsive to issues of handicapping
conditions by utilizing social workers who are attuned to the special needs of
handicapped persons.
Id.
74. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2009).
75. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2016). The Rehabilitation Act extends the nondiscrimination
requirements of the ADA to all “programs and activities” that receive federal funding. Id.
76. DOJ & HSS Letter, supra note 49, at 11 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5)).
77. Id. at 11–12.
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implementing appropriate reunification services, failing to identify an
appropriate service plan, and then making no effort to assist the mother
with the service plan tasks required of her in order to achieve
reunification.78 Furthermore, they found that DCF did not provide
meaningful visitation for Sara and her daughter or the opportunity for her
to enhance her parenting skills, and it did not follow the obligation to
impose only necessary and legitimate safety requirements.79 These
requirements were not met despite Sara and her attorney repeatedly and
persistently advocating for more visitation.80 Part of the struggle lies in
the fact that there is no real way for parents like Sara to ensure that these
requirements are being met by DCF due to the ambiguity of the term
“reasonable.”81 Furthermore, even if the court were to find that DCF had
failed to make reasonable efforts and accommodations, it has been unclear
how much power the juvenile judge has to demand that such services be
provided before a parent’s rights can be terminated.
However, there is not a complete lack of direction as to what
reasonable accommodations or services DCF may provide for parents
with intellectual disabilities. DCF’s placement policy identifies a number
of reasonable efforts that can be taken to prevent out-of-home placement,
specifically meant to provide parenting assistance to “compensate for
deficits, if problem is due to primary caretaker’s lack of certain capacities
due to mental retardation, mental or physical illness.”82 These identified
reunification services include “a spectrum of services that supports
maintenance of the family unit, and enables adults or children to meet the
goals of a service plan.”83 The DOJ and HHS investigation points out that
Sara was directly in the target population for such services, as they are
intended for “parents, expectant parents, or primary caregivers whose
families are at the risk of or are currently experiencing problems with child
abuse or neglect, which may include situations of . . . [r]isk due to

78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 6.
81. See Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 360 (1992) (“How the State was to comply with
[the reasonable efforts] directive . . . was, within broad limits, left up to the State.”). The
Supreme Court also found that there is no private right of action to enforce the reasonable efforts
requirement. Id. at 364. Finally, while the threatened outcome of a state’s failure to comply
with the reasonable efforts requirement is loss of federal funding to their child protection
programs, this denial has rarely occurred. Kaiser, supra note 16, at 110 (“The combination of
these factors means that state can essentially enforce the reasonable efforts requirement as
rigorously or as loosely as they see fit.”).
82. DOJ & HSS Letter, supra note 49, at 16 (citing 110 MASS. CODE REGS. 7.061) (2015).
83. 110 MASS. CODE REGS. 7.030 (2019).
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physical, developmental and/or emotional disability.”84 Yet Sara was not
provided with the aid that was particularly designed to support parents in
her position because, while these regulations exist, there is yet to be a
meaningful way for parents to ensure that they are implemented.
One service that is arguably the most essential to all parents, and
particularly important for parents with intellectual disabilities, is the
coordination of visitation time. Parents’ ability to access their child,
otherwise known as “visitation,” is a part of the parents’ service plan and
a core concern of both the court and the parents in care and protection
proceedings. The first reason for this is that the maintenance of the
parent/child bond calls directly into question the best interest of the
child.85 Because parents like Sara, whose children are removed on
account of an alleged failure to provide adequate care, are being evaluated
on their ability to acquire these skills, visitation time is particularly vital
for learning parenting skills.86 The American Bar Association has
recommended that child welfare agencies implement daily visits for
parents and infants because “physical proximity with the caregiver is
central to the attachment process.”87 For parents with intellectual
disabilities, having access to their child is of particular importance.88
“Meaningful visitation” was one of the reunification services that the
DOJ and HSS found DCF failed to provide to Sara.89 Specifically, they
found that DCF failed to afford her the opportunity for “frequent,
meaningful visitation with support to learn appropriate care for her
daughter and to address the agency’s concerns.”90 The once-a-week

84. 110 MASS. CODE REGS. 7.061 (2019).
85. L.B. v. Chief Justice of the Probate & Family Court Dep’t, 49 N.E.3d 230, 239 (Mass.
2016).
[B]eing physically present in a child’s life, sharing time and experiences, and
providing personal support are among the most intimate aspects of a parent-child
relationship. For a parent who has lost (or willingly yielded) custody of a child
temporarily to a guardian, visitation can be especially critical because it provides
an opportunity to maintain a physical, emotional, and psychological bond with the
child during the guardianship period, if that is in the child’s best interest . . . .
Id.
86. “[I]n cases where the parent aspires to regain custody at some point, it provides an
opportunity to demonstrate the ability to properly care for the child.” Id.
87. DOJ and HSS Letter, supra note 49, at 20 n.19. “The ABA similarly recommends
that visits occur in the least restrictive, most natural setting while ensuring the safety and wellbeing of the child.” Id.
88. See id. at 20 (emphasizing that by denying Sara frequent and meaningful visitation
time with her daughter, DCF failed to provide services that acknowledged the importance of
“repetition, hands-on instruction, and frequency” to Sara’s ability to learn new skills).
89. Id. at 18.
90. Id. at 20.
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visitation plan was implemented and continued, despite recommendation
for increased visitation from the contracted agency providing Sara with
parenting classes, the psychologist who conducted her parenting
assessment, and Sara herself.91 Walt also recognizes both the value and
critical importance of parenting time, and the authority of the court to
make orders regarding visitation in service of the child’s best interest.92
D. Without Judicial Enforcement, There are Limited Ways to
Challenge the Reunification Services DCF is Providing
A pertinent flaw in the reasonable efforts requirement, and a further
reason that the decision in Walt is so vital to protecting parental rights, is
that there are extremely limited ways to enforce the reasonable efforts
requirement. The fact that the requirement exists in Massachusetts law
does not in and of itself mean that it is followed.93
The finding that DCF has failed to make reasonable efforts lacks
meaning at a termination of parental rights hearing because even if a judge
concludes that DCF failed to make reasonable efforts, the judge has the
authority to rule that removal is in the child’s best interest if the judge
finds the parent to be permanently unfit.94 The only time that a lack of
reasonable efforts finding may hold weight at a termination hearing is on
the rare occasion the judge determines that the failure to provide services
makes it impossible to determine that a parent is permanently unfit.95
For a child to be removed from his or her parents on account of the
parents’ intellectual disabilities the court must find permanent unfitness
by clear and convincing evidence—temporary unfitness is insufficient.96
91. Id. at 7–8.
92. Care & Prot. of Walt, 84 N.E.3d 803, 818–19 (Mass. 2017).
93. Crossley, supra note 15 (finding that, in fact, it is rare that federal funding is withheld
due to a failure to comply with the reasonable efforts requirement, leaving it largely up to the
individual states to determine how this standard is applied).
94. In re Adoption of Ilona, 923 N.E.2d 546, 552 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010), aff’d, 944 N.E.2d
115 (Mass. 2011).
[Where there was] little hope that the mother would become a fit parent, there was
no error in the judge’s decision to terminate the mother’s parental
rights . . . [despite the social workers’ recognition that] the department could have
done more in regard to providing services that were more closely tailored to the
mother’s level of functioning.
Id.
95. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760, 769 (1982) (holding that the standard for
unfitness is by the preponderance of the evidence, and that “until the State proves parental
unfitness, the child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of
their natural relationship”).
96. In considering the fitness of the child’s parent or caretaker, the judge may consider, as
one of fourteen factors, whether the parent has “a condition which is reasonably likely to
continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period, such as alcohol or drug addiction, mental
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However, the challenge that parents with disabilities face is that they may
not raise non-compliance with the ADA for the first time at the
termination of parental rights hearing.97 This then begs the question: when
can such a claim be meaningfully raised? And when it is raised, is there
an enforceable result? Adoption of Gregory made clear that DCF is in fact
required by law to provide adequately tailored services for parents with
disabilities.98 The catch twenty-two is that parents cannot raise the
defense at termination,99 so without judicial authority to mandate that the
proper services be offered during the pendency of the litigation, the
determination of adequate services is left completely to the discretion of
DCF.100 As the Sara Gordon investigation clearly illustrates, this level of
deference has the potential to cause significant harm to Massachusetts
families.
One suggestion offered in Gregory for raising the claim in a timely
manner was to pursue a claim that the services offered in the service plan
were inadequate through an administrative fair hearing or other grievance
process.101 This solution is insufficient on several fronts. First, in
Massachusetts, the fair hearings process is conducted within DCF’s legal
office, so although impartiality is written into the policy,102 it may be
difficult to achieve in reality. Second, the fair hearing process can take up
to ninety days,103 and due to the time-sensitive nature of a care and
protection case, this delay can be a damaging length of time for both
parents and children. Finally, the Supreme Court has found that the
AACWA does not create a private cause of action for seeking enforcement
of the reasonable efforts requirement,104 meaning that if parents are
dissatisfied with the fair hearings decision, they cannot seek redress
against DCF by filing suit against the agency.
deficiency or mental illness, and the condition makes the parent or other person . . . unlikely to
provide minimally acceptable care of the child.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 3(c)(xii) (2019).
97. Adoption of Gregory raised for the first time the question of whether the Americans
with Disabilities Act applies to the termination of parental rights. See Adoption of Gregory,
747 N.E.2d 120, 123 (Mass. 2001). The court concluded that a claim of inadequate services
under the ADA could not be raised as a defense to termination of parental rights at a TPR
hearing. Id.
98. Id. at 126.
99. Adoption of Daisy, 934 N.E.2d 252, 262 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010) (“It is well-established
that a parent must raise a claim of inadequate services in a timely manner.”).
100. Gregory, 747 N.E.2d at 123.
101. Id. at 127.
102. The fair hearings process is intended to provide clients who are dissatisfied with
certain actions an “informal hearing . . . to receive a just and fair decision from an impartial
hearing officer . . . .” 110 MASS. CODE REGS. 10.01 (2019).
103. 110 MASS. CODE REGS. 10.29 (2019).
104. Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 363 (1992).
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Another way that a parent may seek remedy for lack of appropriate
services resulting in the termination of parental rights is by appellate
review.105 However, prior to Walt, virtually no appellate decisions held
that DCF failed to uphold its statutory obligation to make reasonable
efforts to either prevent removal or promote reunification.106 In fact, there
have been only two cases in Massachusetts where the appellate court
found that the Department failed to provide adequate support to a family
in pursuit of reunification.107 Attorneys around the country report that few
care and protection cases are appealed at all, and even fewer are
reversed.108 These procedural challenges illustrate the unique nature of
care and protection law and highlight the critical importance of policies
that provide families with adequate and timely remedies during the care
and protection litigation. The reasonable efforts requirement was
established to ensure that irreparable damage is not done to the delicate
relationships between children and their natural parents;109 if it is to serve
its purpose, the reasonable efforts requirement must be paired with a
means of enforcement.
Part of the difficulty for appeals courts is that by the time a parent
appeals the termination of parental rights, the child may have been placed
in substitute care for several years.110 The fact that a reversal of the trial
decision will disrupt the potential permanency of the child inevitably
impacts the ruling of appellate judges in care and protection cases.111 By
the time the breach of duty is found the bond between the child and their
105. A challenge to the termination of parental rights will result in the reviewing court
“determin[ing] whether the judge’s findings were clearly erroneous and whether [the
Department] proved parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence.” Custody of Eleanor,
610 N.E.2d 938, 943 (Mass. 1993).
106. Kaiser, supra note 16, at 111 n.40.
107. Care & Prot. of Elaine, 764 N.E.2d 917, 922 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002) (holding that
DCF’s efforts to help the father acquire housing were insufficient); Care & Prot. of Talbot, No.
01-P-1831, 2002 WL 31455226, at *1–2 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 4, 2002) (reversing termination
of parental rights on account of the trial judge’s reliance on stale information, and because DCF
offered the mother a “paucity of services” despite her repeated requests for increased services).
108. Should a Mental Illness Mean You Lose Your Kid?, PROPUBLICA (May 30, 2014,
5:45 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/should-a-mental-illness-mean-you-lose-your-kid
[https://perma.cc/3TZ9-SEY3]. Attorneys explained that in termination cases, appellate judges
are typically very deferential to the trial court’s decision. Id.
109. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (2019).
110. Kaiser, supra note 16, at 103, 103 (“When the appellate court of any state reverses a
decision of a trial court in a care and protection or adoption case it may also be reversing years
of work to obtain permanency, safety, and emotional well-being for children who are parties to
the case.”).
111. Id. at 113 (“The appellate courts have often excused decidedly non-heroic efforts by
the Department as good enough to meet its standards, especially when a failure to so find would
undo the placement of the child.”).
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natural parents may have been too far lost, and the damage done—
reunification may no longer be in the child’s best interest. At that point,
the appellate judges might be influenced by this consideration, despite the
legal conclusion that the family’s rights had been violated during the care
and protection proceedings.112 And it would not be wrong to have in mind
such considerations, because the development of a child happens
incredibly quickly and the bonds made in early years have a significant
impact on a child’s health and sense of security.113
Finally, while the trial judge must make a determination as to whether
reasonable efforts towards reunification were made, a failure to adhere to
this requirement does not preclude the judge from making a determination
based upon the best interests of the child at the TPR hearing.114 The
finding of whether or not the removal was in the child’s best interest is a
factual finding, creating a higher deference in judicial review. Therefore,
it would be difficult, if not impossible, for parents to raise lack of
reasonable efforts on appeal and win on that argument.115
A more impactful remedy for parents than appealing their termination
of parental rights would be to argue, in the moment, that they are not being
provided with adequate services or visitation time to support their family’s
reunification. By bringing a motion for adequate services and visitation
before the juvenile judge, family defense lawyers may be able to protect
the rights of their clients before the time for a meaningful remedy has
passed. This mechanism of advocacy, however, depends on the premise
112. For example, in Adoption of Gregory, 501 N.E.2d 1179, 1180–81 (Mass. App. Ct.
1986), DCF made no efforts to reunify the family for the first twenty months of separation, and
when efforts were made, they amounted to drafting a list of tasks that the parents needed to
complete before they could reunify with their children. Despite these extremely limited efforts
toward reunification, the appeals court focused on the children’s emotional state and bond with
their pre-adoptive parents in their decision to uphold the trial court’s decision. Id. at 1183.
113. See generally Noah Barish, Using the Harm of Removal and Placement to Advocate
for Parents, JUVENILE RIGHTS PROJECT, INC. (Jan. 7, 2010), http://
www.youthrightsjustice.org/media/3844/xxharmandlreplacement.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BW29ZP7] (providing research on the long-term harm associated with removal from a parent or
parents); William Wan, What Separation from Parents Does to Children: “The Effect is
Catastrophic”, WASH. POST (June 18, 2018, 6:15 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
national/health-science/what-separation-from-parents-does-to-children-the-effect-iscatastrophic/2018/06/18/c00c30ec-732c-11e8-805c-4b67019fcfe4_story.html
[https://perma.cc/EZ5M-NGZH].
114. MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 119, § 29C (2019) (“A determination by the court that
reasonable efforts were not made shall not preclude the court from making any appropriate order
conducive to the child’s best interest.”); Adoption of Ilona, 944 N.E.2d 115, 123 (Mass. 2011)
(“[E]ven when the department has failed to meet [the reasonable efforts] obligation, a trial judge
must still rule in the child’s best interest.”).
115. Adoption of Gregory held, in regard to accommodating a parent’s disability, that “a
parent must raise a claim of inadequate services in a timely manner so that reasonable
accommodations may be made.” 747 N.E.2d 120, 127 (Mass. 2001).
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that where a judge finds that DCF has not met the reasonable efforts
requirement, the judge maintains the equitable authority to order DCF to
adjust the services and visitation that they are currently offering.
While it remains clear that DCF has a statutory obligation to make
reasonable efforts to keep the natural family together, both before removal
and before the TPR hearing, the breadth of the judge’s authority to make
specific orders to DCF remains unsettled in Massachusetts.116 Walt has
provided a clear affirmation of the equitable authority that judges have,
permitting injunctive relief to families for increased services prior to
removing the child from the home.117 The following Part argues that the
authority granted in Walt extends to subsequent stages in the care and
protection proceeding, ensuring that parents are provided with adequate
services to support reunification throughout the litigation, and certainly
before DCF moves to terminate their parental rights.118
II. THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN CARE AND PROTECTION
PROCEEDINGS
Generally, judicial review of agency decisions acts as a crucial
mechanism for protecting due process rights within the realm of
administrative law,119 yet this Part argues that in the context of reasonable

116. See Care & Prot. of Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d 1029, 1033 (Mass. 1995).
[W]e recognize that the statutory scheme is, in some respects, unclear and leaves
room for the parties . . . to make conflicting arguments about the proper role of a
court in reviewing the department’s placement decisions. The Legislature may
wish to examine the statute to state more definitively the scope of a court’s
authority when passing on those decisions.
Id.
117. Care & Prot. of Walt, 84 N.E.3d 803, 818 (Mass. 2017) (finding that the single justice
was authorized to order equitable relief for the parents after determining that the department had
failed to make reasonable efforts); see also Balmelli O’Connor, supra note 18 (recognizing the
court’s role in ensuring that DCF follows its statutory obligations and only uses foster care as a
last resort).
118. Notably, nothing in the statutory language suggests that there is any differentiation
between the reasonable efforts requirement as applied prior to removal, and the requirement as
applied after custody has been granted to DCF. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 29C (2019).
Additionally, in Walt, the child had already been placed in DCF’s custody at the time when the
single justice ordered services and visitation for the father. 84 N.E.3d at 819.
119. Section 14 of Chapter 30A, the statute that provides for judicial review of state
agencies in Massachusetts, provides that “except so far as any provision of law expressly
precludes judicial review, any person or appointing authority aggrieved by a final decision of
any agency in an adjudicatory proceeding . . . shall be entitled to a judicial review . . . .” MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 30A, § 14 (2018); see also Edward D. Re, Due Process, Judicial Review, and
the Rights of the Individual, 39 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (1991); William H. Chamblee,
Administrative Law: Journey Through the Administrative Process and Judicial Review of
Administrative Actions, 16 ST. MARY’S L. J. 155, 182 (1984) (“Administrative agencies now
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efforts, the typical abuse of discretion standard is not the proper test for
the court to employ. In child protection proceedings, the court plays a
much more active role than in most administrative proceedings due to the
fundamental nature of the rights at stake.120 Instead of the agency taking
on the role of the adjudicator until all other administrative remedies are
exhausted, the juvenile court rules on the agency’s activities at many
stages of litigation.121 This creates a form of “co-parenting” between the
juvenile court and the child protection agency,122 wherein both the parents
and the state agency are subject to frequent review and assessment by the
court.123 This structure is meant to protect parents’ rights and to be
sensitive to the impact that prolonged and unnecessary separation can
have on families124 by holding DCF accountable to their own regulations
and statutory requirements.125
The relationship between agency and court implicates a deep issue of
separation of the executive and judiciary, towing a delicate line between

control modern society to such an extent that the rights and liberties of all individuals are
affected.”).
120 See cases cited supra note 2.
121 See, e.g., Care & Prot. of Walt, 84 N.E.3d 803, 809–811 (Mass. 2017). Parents are
entitled to a hearing before their child is removed from their custody, as articulated in Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650 (1972), but in extraordinary circumstances, a post-deprivation
hearing will suffice in satisfying due process rights. Jordan ex rel. Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d
333, 345 (4th Cir. 1994).
Continuing oversight provides an opportunity for the court to account for changes
in the circumstances of the child or the parents, for evolving relationships with
individuals significant to the child, for new information coming to light, and for
deficiencies in a dispositional plan that become apparent over time, all of which
may have an impact on the continuing efficacy of the original dispositional
plan. . . . The juvenile court thus carries a continuing and dynamic responsibility
to safeguard the interests of its wards.
Bruce A. Boyer, Jurisdictional Conflicts Between Juvenile Courts and Child Welfare Agencies:
The Uneasy Relationship Between Institutional Co-Parents, 54 MD. L. REV. 377, 388 (1995).
122. Boyer, supra note 121, at 383–85.
123. WILLIAM G. JONES, WORKING WITH THE COURTS IN CHILD PROTECTION 8, 26–37
(2006), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubpdfs/courts.pdf [https://perma.cc/35Y4-ZPSG]
(providing a non-state-specific outline of a care and protection proceeding from initial hearing
through termination). “Today, juvenile court judges hear cases alleging child abuse and neglect,
delinquency, and status offenses. Most also hear [termination of parental rights] cases and
adoption matters.” Id. at 8.
124 See Nell Clement, Do “Reasonable Efforts” Require Cultural Competence? The
Importance of Culturally Competent Reunification Services in the California Child Welfare
System, 5 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 397, 418–19 (2008) (explaining the harmful effects
that removal can have on children and parents alike, with a particular focus on culturally diverse
families and communities).
125. See JONES, supra note 123, at 26–27 (providing a detailed explanation of the various
hearings that parents are entitled to before the court, including the preliminary hearing, TPR
hearing).
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when the judge is required to afford deference to DCF’s decisions,126 and
when the judge may make a determination that DCF is in violation of its
statutory obligations and require a specific remedy.127 Judicial review of
DCF decisions is necessary, because “[r]emoval of children irrevocably
from their biological parents is an exceptionally far reaching exercise of
State power.”128 However, when it comes to the reasonable efforts
requirement, a substantial amount of judicial deference is given to DCF in
regard to whether they have provided adequate reunification services,
such as visitation time, parenting classes, and re-housing.129 Some reasons
for this deference are the lack of clarity around the definition of reasonable
efforts130 and the fact that courts are already hesitant to interfere with an
administrative agency’s allocation of resources.131 While the tension
between the executive and judiciary in the realm of administrative law has
been comprehensively analyzed, “the doctrinal tools used to resolve
tensions between administrative agencies and their judicial monitors have

126. See Boyer, supra note 121, at 383–84.
[T]he relationship between juvenile courts and child welfare agencies is not always
easy, and the boundaries of their respective responsibilities are not always
clear. . . .
....
. . . [T]he range of views among appellate courts called upon to resolve these
turf wars may be attributed to the awkward application to the juvenile context of
conventional tools of administrative and public law, including the separation of
powers doctrine and the prudential administrative doctrine of exhaustion of
remedies. Many reviewing courts have sought to apply these principles to the
unique relationship between juvenile courts and child welfare agencies within the
context of broad and imprecisely drawn statutory schemes. The result is often a
prohibition on juvenile courts making decisions in areas considered within the
agency’s discretion.
Id. (citations omitted).
127. Care & Prot. of Walt, 84 N.E.3d 803, 819 (Mass. 2017) (“[W]here a court
contemplates an injunctive order to compel an executive agency to take specific steps, it must
tread cautiously in order to safeguard the separation of powers mandated by art. 30 of the
Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution.”) (quoting Smith v. Comm’r of
Transitional Assistance, 729 N.E.2d 627, 651 (Mass. 2000)).
128. Adoption of Katharine, 674 N.E.2d 256, 258 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997).
129. LEONARD EDWARDS, REASONABLE EFFORTS: A JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE 39 (2014)
(“Whether the juvenile court tries these issues is difficult to determine. State appellate decisions
and comments from participants in many states court systems indicate that they are rarely
litigated.” (footnotes omitted)).
130. See sources cited supra note 13 and accompanying text (explaining how the lack of
definition at the federal level has impacted state enforcement of the reasonable efforts
requirement).
131. Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law, 60
ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 16–20 (2008).
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failed to take adequate account of either the peculiarities of juvenile law
or the practical problems that plague the field of child welfare.”132
A. Judicial Deference to Agency Decision-Making
Each state’s legislature is responsible for the “delineation of shared
authority between juvenile courts and child welfare agencies.”133 The
delineation of responsibility in the context of care and protection law is
far from clear, with many areas of overlap, making it difficult for courts
to know when they are authorized to make orders contrary to the actions
or decisions promulgated by DCF.134 The previous standard for judicial
review of child welfare agency decisions in Massachusetts was
established in two cases decided on the same day in 1995. Care and
Protection of Isaac135 and Care and Protection of Jeremy136 grappled with
judicial intervention in DCF, specifically in the case of child placement
decisions.137 The SJC concluded in both cases that, at least when DCF is
deciding where a child should be placed, decisions of this type rest
squarely within the agency’s custodial decision-making responsibility and
may only be overruled by a finding of abuse of discretion.138 Once the
court identifies, as it did in Isaac and Jeremy, that the decision being
reviewed is one over which the agency has discretion, it must apply an
abuse of discretion (or “arbitrary and capricious”) standard of review.139
132. Boyer, supra note 121, at 385.
133. Id. at 386.
134. Id. at 383 (“[T]he relationship between juvenile courts and child welfare agencies is
not always easy, and the boundaries of their respective responsibilities are not always clear.”).
The jurisdictions of the juvenile court and DHS overlap in numerous and varied
areas. One such area involves family services, which is defined in the Juvenile
Code . . . as . . . “including, but not limited to: child care; homemaker services;
crisis counseling; cash assistance transportation; family therapy; physical,
psychiatric, or psychological evaluation; counseling; or treatment, provided to a
juvenile or his family.”
Id. at 383 n.13 (quoting Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Clark, 802 S.W.2d 461, 463 (Ark. 1992))
(emphasis added). DHS is the Arkansas equivalent of DCF.
135. See generally Care & Prot. of Isaac, 646 N.E.2d 1034 (Mass. 1995).
136. See generally Care & Prot. of Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d 1029 (Mass. 1995).
137. ee infra Part III.
138. Id.
139. The Administrative Procedures Act establishes that agency decisions may only be
set aside if “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). The Massachusetts statute providing for judicial review of
administrative agency decisions is MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 30A, § 14 (2019). Abuse of discretion
has been applied commonly, along with the clearly erroneous standard, by juvenile courts
reviewing the actions of child welfare agencies. Boyer, supra note 121, at 421 n.94; see In re
B.L.J., 717 P.2d 376, 380 (Alaska 1986) (“[T]he abuse of discretion standard of review is
appropriate when the court is presented with agency actions on matters committed to the
agency’s discretion.”); O’Bryan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 594 P.2d 739, 741 (Nev. 1979)
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To differentiate the holdings in these two cases from that of Walt, brief
synopses of Isaac and Jeremy are provided, followed by an assessment of
the court’s application of the abuse of discretion standard in the latter two
cases.
1.

Care and Protection of Isaac

In this case, the SJC reviewed the juvenile judge’s authority to order,
over the objection of DCF, that DCF provide a certain residential
placement for a child in its custody.140 The child and his four siblings had
been adjudicated “children in need of protection” and placed in DCF
custody.141 Shortly after gaining custody of Isaac, DCF placed him in a
specialized school.142 When his emotional state began to deteriorate, DCF
then committed him to an adolescent psychiatric treatment program.143
After some time at the hospital, Isaac’s treating psychiatrist recommended
that he be discharged and allowed to return to the specialized school, with
the addition of a behavioral support staff member assigned to assist him
in the classroom.144 DCF rejected the suggestion, in part because the staff
member assigned to support Isaac would cost DCF an additional $160 per
day.145 DCF had ceased to fund this type of one-to-one service as of 1990,
based on the concern that such services were “inordinately expensive.”146
At the hearing on a motion for increased visitation brought by the mother,
Isaac’s guardian ad litem raised concerns about his continued placement
at the psychiatric hospital.147 The judge, treating the hearing as a review
and redetermination of Isaac and his four siblings’ current needs, ordered
that Isaac be returned to his previous placement and given the support of
a one-to-one aide in the classroom.148 The Department brought a petition
for relief from the order before the single justice, and the justice brought
the issue before the full court.149
(finding that deference to agency decisions is upheld, unless the court finds that the decisions
were arbitrary or illegal) (the decision in O’Bryan was later questioned by Division of Child and
Family Services v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 92 P.3d 1239, 1246 (Nev. 2004), where the
court held that the court need not apply the arbitrary and capricious standard based on the
subsequent statutory changes providing the juvenile court jurisdiction to make custodial
decisions).
140. Isaac, 646 N.E.2d at 1038.
141. Id. at 1035.
142. Id. at 1036.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1035.
146. Id. at 1036.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1037.
149. Id. at 1036.
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The discrete issue raised by the single justice was whether a “judge
sitting in a juvenile session [has] authority to order the Department . . . to
provide a specific placement and a specific staffing level for a child who
has been adjudicated to be in need of care and protection and committed
to DCF’s (other than temporary) custody.”150 The court concluded that
the judge did not have the authority to make such an order against the
objection of DCF, as DCF maintains the power to make such decisions for
children in its custody, absent a finding of abuse of discretion.151
2.

Care and Protection of Jeremy

While Isaac dealt with the court’s authority to oppose a placement
decision for a child in the permanent custody of DCF, its immediate
successor, Jeremy, dealt with the same question but in reference to a child
who is in the temporary custody of DCF.152 In Care and Protection of
Jeremy, DCF placed the child in a long-term residential treatment program
after removing him from several foster homes due to disruptive
behavior.153 The child’s attorney did not agree with this placement,
arguing that Jeremy should instead be placed in a specialized foster home,
which would be far less restrictive than the residential program.154 After
an evidentiary hearing that spanned several months, the judge agreed with
Jeremy’s attorney’s opposition to his placement and entered an order
requiring DCF to place him in a specialized foster home.155 DCF again
brought a petition for relief from the order before the single justice, who
vacated the order, deciding that the judge had improperly substituted her
“view of what is in the best interest of the child for that of the
[D]epartment.”156 The SJC reached the same conclusion as they had in
Isaac: the judge did not have the authority, absent a finding of abuse of
discretion, to make a decision in opposition to DCF in a matter involving
the placement of a child in DCF’s custody, even if the grant of custody to
DCF was merely temporary.157

150. Id. at 1034.
151. Id. at 1039.
152. Care & Prot. of Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d 1029, 1030 (Mass. 1995).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1030–31.
157. Id. at 1033 (“We have concluded that G.L. c. 119 allots to the department the
authority to determine the residence of a child committed to its custody on a temporary basis.”).
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B. Why Do Courts Apply the Abuse of Discretion Standard?
In both Jeremy and Isaac, the SJC held that the abuse of discretion
standard must be applied in reviewing DCF’s placement decisions, rather
than finding that the judge had the general authority to make a
determination in the best interests of the child.158 The court applied the
abuse of discretion standard because it concluded that these custodial
placement decisions remain squarely within the discretion of DCF,
therefore mandating deference on the part of the court.159 Review under
an abuse of discretion standard is narrow, disallowing the court from
substituting its judgment for that of the agency.160
The threshold question for determining what standard of review to
apply is whether the court is conducting a traditional review of an
administrative decision based on the Massachusetts child welfare statute,
Chapter 119.161 The court in Isaac provides an in-depth analysis of
“whether the administrative scheme created by G.L. c. 119, §§ 21–
37 . . . differs substantially from the ordinary administrative scheme in the
degree of authority given to the courts and the manner in which it may be
exercised,”162 by scrutinizing how Chapter 119 allocates authority. To

158. Throughout its analysis, the court in Isaac draws a distinction between the court’s
power to decide to whom custody will be assigned, and custodial decisions to be made after
custody has been decided. For example, Section 29B provides that when “conducting a
permanency hearing, the court may make any appropriate orders as may be in the child or the
young adult’s best interests including, but not limited to, orders with respect to care or custody.”
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 29B (2018). Yet the court rejected the trial judge’s conclusion
that “G.L. c. 119, considered in its entirety, grants authority to a judge to resolve a dispute
between the department and other interested parties concerning a suitable residential placement
for a child in the department’s custody.” Care & Prot. of Isaac, 646 N.E.2d 1034, 1037 (Mass.
1995).
159. Isaac, 646 N.E.2d at 1041 (“[W]e take this opportunity to discuss how a judge in a
care and protection proceeding should handle a challenge to the department’s exercise of its
custodial powers.”) (emphasis added); Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d at 1033 (“[The last sentence of §
29] cannot logically be read to contain a broad grant of authority to a judge to impose conditions
or limitations on the department’s exercise of its custodial powers.”) (emphasis added). In
Hawaii, the Court of Appeals grappled with this same question. The court originally found that
“‘the decision as to what custodial arrangements are in the best interests of the child is a matter
or question of ultimate fact reviewable under the clearly erroneous standard of review,’ insofar
as it applies to a family court’s review of a DHS determination that its placement decision is in
a child’s best interest.” In re AS, 312 P.3d 1193, 1213 (Haw. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting In Interest
of Doe, 784 P.2d 873, 880 (Haw. Ct. App. 1989)). In re AS overturned this standard of review,
finding that “the family court, based on the evidence presented, must make its own
determination regarding whether the placement of the child is in the child’s best interest.” Id.
160. See U.S. Postal Serv. v. Gregory, 534 U.S. 1, 6–7 (2001); Marsh v. Oregon Natural
Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989); Barnes v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 655 F.3d 1124, 1132
(9th Cir. 2011); Gardner v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 638 F.3d 1217, 1224 (9th Cir. 2011).
161. See generally MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119 (2019).
162. Isaac, 646 N.E.2d at 1037.
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reach the conclusion that Chapter 119 does not provide a general grant of
authority to the judge to enter orders in the best interest of the child, the
court looked to the second paragraph of Section 26, which provides the
action the court can take if a child is found in need of care and
protection.163 The trial judge relied upon this section for the authority to
resolve disputes between the parent or guardian and DCF about custodial
decisions.164 The court points out the disjunctive language in the statute,
that the judge “may commit the child to the custody of the
department . . . or may make any other appropriate order with reference
to the care and custody of the child as may conduce to his best interests.”165
Following this language, the court concluded that once the judge
determines that placing the child in the custody of DCF is in the best
interest of the child, DCF asserts the authority to make all custodial
decisions and the judge can no longer intervene.166
Interestingly, Section 26 of Chapter 119 is no longer written in the
disjunctive, and instead provides that the court “also may make any other
appropriate order . . . about the care and custody of the child as may be in
the child’s best interest” and then provides a non-exhaustive list of
potential custodial orders, for example “order[ing] appropriate physical
care including medical or dental.”167 This amendment to the statute
arguably alters the analysis provided by the court in Isaac. At the time
when Jeremy and Isaac were decided, the SJC pointed to the lack of clarity
around the scope of the judge’s authority in the area of child welfare law
and suggested that legislative action may be appropriate to clarify under
whose authority placement decisions fall.168 Were this same issue to come
before the court again, it is possible that the SJC would conclude that
Section 26 does in fact provide the judge with general authority to resolve
disputes and make a determination in the best interest of the child, even
for custodial decisions such as placement and education.169 Regardless,
the change in the language of Section 26 may provide additional support
for equitable judicial authority over decisions that implicate the best
interests of the child.
The SJC also focused on the language found in Section 21, which
provides the definition of “custodial” and instructions on what a parent or
163. ch. 119, § 26.
164. Isaac, 646 N.E.2d at 1038.
165. Id. at 1037 n.3 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 119, § 26) (emphasis added).
166. Id. at 1038.
167. § 26(b) (emphasis added).
168. See Care & Prot. of Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d 1029, 1033 (Mass. 1995).
169. See Div. of Child & Family Servs. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 92 P3d 1239, 1246
(Nev. 2004).

154

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:127

guardian may do if they disagree with a custodial decision made by
DCF.170 If a parent or guardian is dissatisfied with a custodial decision,
they may challenge that decision, and the judge is authorized to “review
and make an order on the matter.”171 In Isaac, the child’s attorney argued
that in the absence of language limiting the standard of review to abuse of
discretion, such legislative intent should not be presumed.172 The SJC,
however, adopted a traditional reading of “review” in the context of
judicial review of an administrative proceeding, concluding that “the
appropriate standard of review is error of law or abuse of discretion, as
measured by the ‘arbitrary or capricious test.’”173
Following its analysis in Isaac, the court reaffirms the scope of
judicial authority in Jeremy, further elaborating on its finding that Chapter
119 does not grant power to the judiciary to make custodial decisions.174
While the court acknowledged that a grant of equitable jurisdiction “is a
grant of broad power to act in the best interests of a person properly within
the jurisdiction of the court,”175 that power does not include “decid[ing]
questions committed by law to the determination of public officials.”176
“[W]here the means of carrying out [a] statutory duty is within the
discretion of the public official, courts normally will not direct how the
public official should exercise that statutory duty.”177 The court
acknowledges its struggle to parse out the extent of equitable authority by
stating:
[W]e recognize that the statutory scheme is, in some respects, unclear
and leaves room for the parties in this case, and in Care and Protection
of Isaac . . . to make conflicting arguments about the proper role of a
court in reviewing the department’s placement decisions. The
Legislature may wish to examine the statute to state more definitively
the scope of a court’s authority when passing on those decisions.178

Perhaps the most illustrative example of the court’s uncertainty
applying this level of administrative deference is the court’s

170. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119 § 21 (2019); Care & Prot. of Isaac, 646 N.E.2d 1034,
1038–39 (Mass. 1995).
171. Isaac, 646 N.E.2d at 1038.
172. Id. at 1039.
173. Id. (quoting Caswell v. Licensing Comm’n for Brockton, 444 N.E.2d 922, 930 (Mass.
1983)).
174. Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d at 1031.
175. Id. at 1033.
176. Id. (quoting Capuano, Inc. v. School Bldg. Comm. of Wilbraham, 115 N.E.2d 491,
492 (Mass. 1953)).
177. Id.
178. Id.
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acknowledgment that a judge’s equitable authority may fluctuate
depending on the type of custodial decision being made. The court
reasoned that decisions such as the “termination of visitation between a
child and his parents, and the authorization for extraordinary forms of
medical treatment, raise issues not raised by the choice of a child’s
residence.”179 In support of this distinction, the court states that the judge
has broader discretion in these types of custodial decisions “for reasons
not related to the structure and language of the governing legislation.”180
Therefore, it is fair to say that this decision is limited to the placement of
children in DCF’s temporary or permanent custody.
This means, in terms of the reasonable efforts requirement, that it is
not necessarily clear what level of judicial review should be applied to
DCF’s decisions about what services to provide, because while efforts to
reunify the family may include decisions about the placement of the child,
such efforts are not limited to custodial decisions.181 The matter of what
services DCF does or does not provide for families relates to “issues not
raised by the choice of a child’s residence,”182 such as DCF’s direct
statutory obligations and the rights of parents under the ADA. While the
analysis provided in Jeremy and Isaac helps to illuminate how courts
contemplate the issue of judicial review of DCF decisions, Care and
Protection of Walt provides a different form of judicial review in the face
of DCF’s failure to fulfill a statutory obligation.183 The very same failure
that kept Sara Gordon separated from her baby daughter for over two
years.184
III. THE GRANT OF EQUITABLE AUTHORITY WHEN DCF FAILS TO
MAKE REASONABLE EFFORTS
The consecutive rulings in Isaac and Jeremy at once affirmed the
power of DCF and limited the power of the judiciary. This limitation was
based on the fact that the agency’s objection to a placement change
remained squarely within its custodial powers without violating any
statutory obligations and did not infringe on the rights of children or

179. Id. at 1031 n.7.
180. Id.
181. See 110 MASS. CODE REGS. 7.002–7.095 (2019) (providing a list of services
available to families in Massachusetts, including homemaking services, parent aide services,
and emergency shelter services).
182. Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d at 1031 n.7.
183. See Care & Prot. of Walt, 84 N.E.3d 803, 817–820 (Mass. 2017).
184. DOJ & HSS Letter, supra note 49, at 6.
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parents.185 The decisions contested in both Isaac and Jeremy did not
directly contradict DCF’s policies and regulations, because while DCF is
tasked with making decisions in the best interests of the child, it is also
bound to consider allocation of resources when making custodial
decisions.186 In contrast, the decision made by DCF in Walt directly
implicated a statutory obligation.187 Therefore, the SJC’s decision in Walt
does not necessarily overrule Jeremy and Isaac.188 The distinction made
in Walt explicitly addresses the custodial nature of the decisions in Jeremy
and Isaac and distinguishes such decisions from instances where DCF
failed to meet an obligation.189 The ruling in Walt provides family defense
attorneys with a valuable solution for the lack of timely remedy for their
clients who are not receiving adequate support in their efforts towards
family reunification.
A. Care and Protection of Walt
The child in Walt was removed from his home at the age of three after
a report was filed with DCF alleging neglect against Walt’s parents.190
The DCF investigator arrived at the apartment unannounced to follow up
on the report, and (as was illuminated during the seventy-two-hour
custody hearing) made the decision within ten minutes of entering the
apartment to remove Walt from the home.191 The investigator’s major
concerns were the state of the home and the smell of marijuana.192
According to the investigator, the upstairs portion of the home, where the
family was living, was littered with trash, including dirty plates, cups,
cigarette butts, and a chicken bone.193 The investigator, with the approval
of her supervisor, initiated an emergency removal and Walt went into DCF
custody.194 The affidavit attached to DCF’s petition for temporary
custody, which was signed by both the supervisor and the investigator,
stated that “reasonable efforts by the department were attempted.”195
However, at the seventy-two-hour hearing, the investigator admitted that
she did not know whether DCF could provide assistance with cleaning the
185. “[I]n this case, we are concerned with the department’s authority to determine the
place of abode of a child in its custody.” Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d at 1031 n.7.
186. Care & Prot. of Isaac, 646 N.E.2d 1034, 1036–37 (Mass. 1995).
187. Care & Prot. of Walt, 84 N.E.3d 803, 814 (Mass. 2017).
188. Id. at 819.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 807.
191. Id. at 810.
192. Id. at 808.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 809.
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home, or whether “counseling and management services” were available
to the parents prior to removal.196 She also testified that “it was not her
job to make reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removal
before removing a child to the custody of the department.”197
The father petitioned for interlocutory relief, and the single justice of
the Massachusetts Appeals Court determined that DCF had an obligation
to adhere to their statutory mandates, namely the obligation to make
reasonable efforts prior to removal.198 Finding that DCF had failed to
make any reasonable efforts, the single justice found DCF did not meet its
obligation.199 Not only did the single justice make a determination that no
reasonable efforts had been made, but he also remedied the situation by
making specific orders for DCF to provide services.200 The services
ordered included daily supervised visitation between Walt and his father,
that Walt’s father be included in special education meetings, and that DCF
explore alternative housing options for the parents, all in support of
reunification.201
Faced again with the challenge of defining the scope of equitable
authority, the SJC came to a quite different conclusion than it did in Isaac
or Jeremy. Rather than applying an abuse of discretion standard, the court
acknowledged that at the seventy-two-hour hearing, the judge has the
responsibility to determine whether reasonable efforts were made prior to
removal of the child, “separate and distinct from the judge’s certification
regarding the child’s best interests that decides whether the child should
remain in the custody of the department.”202 The fact that abuse of
discretion was not the standard applied in Walt suggests that enforcement
of the reasonable efforts requirement should be evaluated differently than
custodial decisions regarding children in DCF custody. Because the judge
was not reviewing a custodial decision made by DCF at the behest of a
parent or guardian, but instead making a determination required by state
statute,203 the court recognized that judges have equitable authority in this
area.204 Furthermore, the court found that the authority granted to the
196. Id. at 810.
197. Id.
198. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 29C (2019).
199. Walt, 84 N.E.3d at 810.
200. Id. at 810–11.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 817.
203. See supra notes 8, 10, 11 and accompanying text.
204. Walt, 84 N.E.3d at 817 (“Where, as here, the single justice found that the department
failed to fulfil its duty to make reasonable efforts before taking custody of Walt, he had the
equitable authority to order the department to take reasonable remedial steps to diminish the
adverse consequences of its breach of duty.”).
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judge to make the reasonable efforts determination also provides them
with the “authority to order the department to take reasonable remedial
steps to diminish the adverse consequences of the department’s failure to
do so.”205
While the same issues of separation of powers and allocation of
resources exist in Walt, in contrast to Isaac and Jeremy, the holding firmly
supports the single justice’s authority to order DCF to take very specific
action.206 The interpretation of judicial authority follows Jeremy and
Isaac in that the SJC recognized that “where the department has been
awarded temporary custody of a child in a care and protection proceeding,
‘decisions related to normal incidents of custody’ generally are committed
to the discretion of the department, reviewable only for abuse of
discretion.”207 The court elects not to rule on “the full scope of judicial
authority to issue injunctive orders where the department has been
awarded temporary custody of a child, or the limitations on that
authority.”208 However, it is stated concretely that
where the department has been awarded temporary custody of a child
after failing to fulfill its duty to make reasonable efforts to prevent or
eliminate the need for the child’s removal, from parental custody, a
judge has the equitable authority to take reasonable steps to attempt to
remedy the adverse consequences on the child and the parents arising
from the department’s breach of that duty.209

Perhaps part of the court’s willingness to enforce judicial authority in
this area is based on the fact that failure to make reasonable efforts prior
to removing the child can have an immediate and serious impact on the
family, and therefore equitable relief is necessary to counter that harm.210
Because it was too late for DCF to rectify the error by making reasonable
efforts prior to removal, the single justice was justified in “ensur[ing] that
the department fulfilled its duty to make it possible for the child to return
safely to his father or to attempt to hasten the time when that reunification
would become practicable.”211 In this case, the court agreed with the
single justice that in order to protect Walt and his family from the

205. Id. at 807.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 819 (citing Commonwealth v. Adkinson, 813 N.E.2d 506, 513 (Mass. 2004)).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. “[T]he single justice was entitled to conclude from the evidence in the record that the
department’s failure to make reasonable efforts also adversely affected Walt and his family and
that reasonable equitable relief was needed to diminish that adverse impact.” Id. at 818.
211. Id.
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imminent harm of their prolonged separation, it was reasonable to order
DCF to act specifically and immediately to remedy this harm.212
Another reason that the court may have found an expanded grant of
equitable authority in this circumstance is that the single justice did not
attempt to substitute his own judgment for that of DCF while reviewing a
department decision. Instead, the justice ordered injunctive relief in a
response to DCF’s clear failure to meet its statutory imperatives.213 Courts
may be reluctant to order the kind of provided found in Walt because,
“where a court contemplates an injunctive order to compel an executive
agency to take specific steps, it must tread cautiously in order to safeguard
the separation of powers.”214 But if the court does determine that DCF
clearly failed to make reasonable efforts, the judge may find this failure
harmful to the family and provide an injunctive order to remedy the
harm.215
Finally, in Walt, the order for injunctive relief was made in reaction
to the absence of agency action in violation of a statutory obligation.216
This contrasts with Isaac and Jeremy, where the judges substituted their
judgment for that of the agency to rule on a decision between two
placement options, neither of which would have been in violation of
DCF’s statutory requirements.217 “Only when, at the time a judicial order
is entered, there is but one way in which [an] obligation may properly be
fulfilled, is a judge warranted in telling a public agency precisely how it
must fulfill its legal obligation.”218 When making a reasonable efforts
determination, the court must decide whether DCF made adequate efforts
to reunify—not a choice between alternative satisfactory options, but a
question of whether or not DCF met its obligation at all.219 If opposing
212. Id. at 817.
213. Id. at 810–811.
214. Id. at 819 (quoting Smith v. Comm’r of Transitional Assistance, 729 N.E.2d 627,
636 (Mass. 2000)).
215. Id.
216. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 29C (2019).
217. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 23 (2019); Adoption of Talik, 84 N.E.3d 889, 897
(Mass. App. Ct. 2017) (“Placement decisions, as opposed to custody decisions, fall within the
discretionary power of the legal custodian as one of the usual incidents of custody.”) (quoting
Care & Prot. of Manuel, 703 N.E.2d 211, 216 (Mass. 1998)).
218. Care & Prot. of Isaac, 646 N.E.2d 1034, 1037 (Mass. 1995).
219. Particularly when advocating for parents with disabilities, the ADA makes clear that
“no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefit of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity,
or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2016). Application
of the ADA to everything DCF does means that services provided to parents with disabilities
must be catered to these parents’ specific needs, and failure to provide properly tailored services
is a failure to meet the statutory obligation. See DOJ & HSS Letter, supra note 49, at 10.
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counsel can show that DCF failed to meet this obligation, for example, by
not providing any specialized services to a parent with an intellectual
disability, it is no longer solely within the discretion of DCF to determine
how they should meet the requirement. While the “placement of
individuals and the coordination of the provision of services financed by
[a social service agency] are executive functions,”220 the determination of
whether or not DCF has fulfilled its statutory requirement is a function of
the judiciary.221
B. Applying Care and Protection of Walt Beyond the Temporary
Custody Hearing
Now that Walt has established that the scope of equitable authority
extends to making specific orders that remedy a breach of statutory duty,
the question remains as to whether this same power exists if a judge makes
this determination at the permanency hearing, rather than at the temporary
custody hearing.222 While the Walt court focused on the particular
language regarding reasonable efforts prior to removal, the rest of the
statute states that once a child has been placed in DCF’s custody, the
purpose of the reasonable efforts requirement shifts from “eliminat[ing]
the need for removal from the home” to “mak[ing] it possible for the child
to return safely to his parent or guardian.”223 If the judge has granted
custody to DCF, the judge must decide no less than annually “whether the
department or its agents has made reasonable efforts to make it possible
for the child to return safely to his parent or guardian.”224
Because it is within the court’s power to make specific orders
remedying DCF’s failure prior to taking custody, it logically follows that
this same power exists when DCF breaches the same obligation later in
the proceedings.225 The very same risk of harm to the family exists if DCF
fails to provide a service plan reasonably tailored to the needs of the
parents, regardless of whether this occurs after the child has been
220. Isaac, 646 N.E.2d at 1039.
221. In re McKnight, 550 N.E.2d 856, 859 (Mass. 1990) (holding that where an executive
agency has a legal obligation, and “there is but one way in which that obligation may properly
be fulfilled,” the judiciary may order the enforcement of the obligation).
222. On account of the facts of the case, Walt focused exclusively on the judge’s authority
to remedy a reasonable efforts breach prior to removal of the child from the home. Care & Prot.
of Walt, 84 N.E.3d 801, 810 (Mass. 2017).
223. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 29C (2019).
224. Id.
225. The precise language which requires the court to make a determination of reasonable
efforts prior to placement with DCF is mirrored later in the statute, requiring the court to make
a determination no less than annually as to whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to make
it possible for the child to return safely to his parent or guardian. Id.
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adjudicated in need of care and protection or prior to removal from the
home.226 If parents do not have the opportunity to argue this issue prior
to the TPR hearing, then there is truly no enforcement mechanism
ensuring that this requirement is followed, which may result in improper
removals. The requirement may be overlooked and treated as a
“checking-of-a-box” without meaningful adherence, rather than a true
procedural protection. With the precedent established in Walt, if a court
finds that DCF is failing to make reasonable efforts to reunify the family,
it may take action and order that those efforts be made.227
The amendments to Section 29 of Chapter 119 discussed in Part II
also suggest a legislative change in the allocation of judicial authority
since the deciding of Isaac.228 Because of the shift away from the
disjunctive and the inclusion of a non-exhaustive list of possible actions
that the judge may take in the best interest of the child,229 it could be
reasonably argued that a dissatisfied parent could petition the court to
make orders in the best interest of the child, such as visitation and services
to promote reunification of the family. This would be an additional
avenue for arguing lack of reasonable efforts prior to the TPR hearing, and
it is congruous with the equitable authority granted by Walt. Finally,
while the language of Section 29C makes clear that the court must make
a reasonable efforts determination no less than annually, this does not
necessarily mean that the court is limited to making a reasonable efforts
determination at the permanency hearing.230 The mandate of the
226. The impact of prolonged separation between parent and biological parent, even of
that parent cannot fully provide for all of the child’s needs, is well documented. In Ms. L. v.
U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 310 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1146–47 (S.D. Cal. 2018),
the court relied on an amicus brief submitted by the Children’s Defense Fund, and based on the
arguments presented found:
[T]here is ample evidence that separating children from their mothers or fathers
leads to serious, negative consequences to children’s health and development” and
the stress of forced separation “put[] children at increased risk for both physical
and mental illness . . . . And the psychological distress, anxiety, and depression
associated with separation from a parent would follow the children well after the
immediate period of separation—even after eventual reunification with a parent or
other family.
Id.
227. Care & Prot. of Walt, 84 N.E.3d 803, 820 (Mass. 2017).
228. Supra Section II.B.
229. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 29C (2019).
230. Id.
[I]f a court has previously committed, granted custody or transferred responsibility
for a child to the department or its agent, the court shall determine not less than
annually whether the department or its agent has made reasonable efforts to make
it possible for the child to return safely to his parent or guardian.
Id.
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reasonable efforts requirement is to make reunification possible, and
because this is an ongoing mandate, a parent (or child) could petition the
court to make a determination on an alleged breach of this statutory duty
at any part of the process when the provision of services is, in fact, not
promoting reunification.
C. Judicial Authority over Visitation
In additional support of the argument that the court has equitable
authority to make specific orders for services is the fact that the court may
order visitation in the best interest of the child.231 Even after the custody
of the child has been transferred to DCF, the parents retain the right to
visit their child as long as visitation will not injure the welfare of the child
or the public interest.232 The court addressed this authority specifically in
Walt, emphasizing that “the single justice did not exceed his authority or
abuse his discretion by ordering a visitation schedule that would enable
[the parenting] bond to remain intact.”233 The grant of judicial authority
in this particular area is due to the fact that “visitation, like custody, is at
the core of a parent’s relationship with a child,” and the critical importance
of parenting time to the parent-child relationship implicates the best
interest of the child.234
Additionally, the court may order visitation between parent and child
even after the parent’s rights have been terminated.235 This broad sweep
of equitable authority allows the judge to determine whether the best
interests of the child will be served, and in doing so, allows them to grant
orders that may be against the will of the child’s legal custodian.236 The
court, acting in its capacity to serve the child’s best interests, may even
oppose the adequacy of an adoption plan if it does not provide for
visitation with the biological parents, and such visitation would be in the
231. See Care & Prot. of Three Minors, 467 N.E.2d 851, 860 (Mass. 1984); Custody of a
Minor (No. 2), 467 N.E.2d 1286, 1291 (Mass. 1984) (“[B]efore terminating visitation rights, a
judge must make specific findings demonstrating that parental visits will harm the child or the
public welfare.”).
232. Custody of a Minor, 467 N.E.2d at 1291 (citing Care & Prot. of Three Minors, 467
N.E.2d at 851).
233. Care & Prot. of Walt, 84 N.E.3d 803, 818 (Mass. 2017).
234. Id. at 818 (quoting L.B. v. Chief Justice of the Probate & Family Court Dep’t, 49
N.E. 3d 230, 239 (Mass. 2016)).
235. In re Adoption of Rico, 905 N.E.2d 552, 560 (Mass. 2009) (holding that the court
was within its equitable authority to order post-termination visitation between child and
biological parent where the child’s best interests would be served by maintaining and honoring
that bond).
236. See Youmans v. Ramos, 711 N.E.2d 165, 174 (Mass. 1999) (holding that the court
had authority to order visitation between child and prior permanent guardian, even over the
objections of the father, who had legal custody of the child).
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child’s best interests.237 The position of the juvenile court to make orders
regarding visitation is yet another argument for broad judicial authority to
make orders in the best interests of the child, including provision of
services that will help the child return home.238
D. Impact of Judicial Enforcement of the Reasonable Efforts
Requirement
To illustrate how a broader grant of judicial authority to find a failure
to make reasonable efforts and order a remedy to that failure, it may be
helpful to imagine the impact that this would have as a case unfolds.
Applying a requirement that particular services be offered to parents as a
prerequisite before DCF can change the child’s goal to adoption would
ensure that parents are not deemed unfit before being given the
opportunity to prove their parenting potential.239 Recognizing the court’s
authority to offer relief to parents who are clearly not receiving adequate
services would provide parents with an avenue to compel DCF to provide
a service plan that would meaningfully support reunification of the
family.240
Had the court enforced the provision of services in Sara Gordon’s
case, this family may have had a profoundly different experience. If Sara
had been able to raise a lack of reasonable efforts claim, she could have
argued for increased visitation to support her acquisition of the parenting
skills that were allegedly lacking.241 She could have petitioned for a

237. In re Adoption of Vito, 728 N.E.2d 292, 296 (Mass. 2000) (“[W]e hold that a judge
may order limited postadoption contact, including visitation, between a child and a biological
parent where such contact is currently in the best interests of the child.”).
238. See SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN, FAMILY
TIME PRACTICE GUIDE: A GUIDE TO PROVIDING APPROPRIATE FAMILY TIME FOR CHILDREN
IN FOSTER CARE 45 (2019), http://judgeleonardedwards.com/docs/family-time-georgia.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U2NY-KL8L] (explaining the role of courts in ensuring proper family
visitation time).
239. See Booth & Booth, supra note 1 (providing empirical studies supporting no
connection between intelligence and parenting ability, but explaining that judges and service
providers must work actively to avoid “what might be called the mistake of false attribution or
seeing all the problems parents may be having entirely in terms of their learning difficulties.”).
240. See, e.g., Robyn M. Powell, Safeguarding the Rights of Parents With Intellectual
Disabilities in Child Welfare Cases: The Convergence of Social Science and Law, 20 CUNY L.
REV. 127, 145–47 (2016) (explaining how advocates should use social science and empirical
research about parents with disabilities in order to advocate for their clients and ensure that their
rights are protected).
241. See IASSID Special Interest Research Grp. on Parents & Parenting with Intellectual
Disabilities, Parents Labelled with Intellectual Disability: Position of the IASSID SIRG on
Parents and Parenting with Intellectual Disabilities, 21 J. APPLIED RES. INTELL. DISABILITIES
296, 301 (2008) [hereinafter IASSID SIRG] (reviewing the state of knowledge on parents with
intellectual disabilities and their children, and concluding that parents labeled with intellectual
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parent aide with experience helping parents with intellectual disabilities,
articulating her rights under the ADA, and the necessity of this service to
promote reunification with her daughter. Rather than being forced to
resort to the DOJ after exhausting her options in juvenile court, Sara could
have had the opportunity to efficiently and effectively advocate in court
for the services necessary to help her provide adequate care to her child.
If the judge found that DCF had in fact failed to make reasonable efforts
in compliance with the ADA, the court could have ordered DCF to provide
such services, thereby protecting Sara’s rights prior to her TPR hearing.
If she were then dissatisfied with the court’s decision regarding her
petition for services and DCF’s adherence to the reasonable efforts
requirement, she would have had the opportunity to petition for
interlocutory relief of the court’s ruling on the adequacy of the services
being provided to her. While Sara was able to (and did) advocate for
increased visitation and services, absent a reading of Walt granting
judicial authority to find a lack of reasonable efforts and implement a
remedy, such requests may not result in a court order.242 The current
combination of deference to DCF for defining what are reasonable
reunification services and the stark lack of guidance for social workers on
how to act in compliance with disability law is unlikely to result in
compliance with the ADA and DCF’s statutory requirements.243
The ability to effectively advocate lack of reasonable efforts would
mean ensuring that parents with intellectual disabilities are afforded a fair
chance to prove themselves as capable parents. For parents with
disabilities, as with all parents, caring for children is a learning process.244
With full discretion over what services are adequate, DCF may use the
consequences of its intervention (for example, a parent’s lack of
responsiveness to the child’s cues) to justify the continued separation.
Parents who have limited time with their children begin to lose their
parent-child bond, and the child may become more and more attached to

disabilities “acquire parenting knowledge and skills when appropriate teaching methods are
used.”).
242. Care & Prot. of Jeremy, 646 N.E.2d 1029, 1031 (Mass. 1995).
243. DOJ & HSS Letter, supra note 49, at 23–24. The letter to the Commissioner
recognizes that DCF has “failed to provide appropriate policies and training for social workers
to understand their obligations to ensure the civil rights of parents with disabilities.” Id.
244. See generally Maurice A. Feldman, Parenting Education for Parents with
Intellectual Disabilities: A Review of Outcome Studies, 15 RES. DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES
299 (1994) (providing a detailed review of twenty different studies addressing parenting
abilities of parents with intellectual disabilities and recognizing the need for further research in
the area of programs that teach parenting skills to this group of parents).
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their substitute placement.245 Additionally, a hands-on learning method is
particularly important for parents with disabilities.246 A social worker
with no experience working with parents with intellectual disabilities may
not feel it necessary or appropriate to provide any education to the parents
during their visits, yet this support during visitation is precisely what
would most help the parents.247 Without frequent visitation and parenting
education, a parent with an intellectual disability is unlikely to see
improvement in the areas identified by DCF as the reason for the
parent/child separation.248 At that point, the lack of progress may be used
to prove permanent unfitness at the TPR hearing, when it would be too
late to raise an argument of insufficient efforts.
The DOJ and HSS report provides many suggestions for services, and
in fact, these services are largely drawn from DCF’s own policies.249 Yet
clearly the mere existence of these policies remains insufficient to ensure
their implementation, and the services provided to parents with
intellectual disabilities are in desperate need of bolstering.250 Court
enforcement would not only benefit parents like Sara, but would also
245. Attachment—Babies, Young Children and Their Parents, PARENTING & CHILD
HEALTH,
https://www.cyh.com/HealthTopics/HealthTopicDetails.aspx?p=114&np=99&id=1931
[https://perma.cc/3ZW2-6D23].
246. Maurice A. Feldman et al., Teaching Child-Care Skills to Mothers with
Developmental Disabilities, 25 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 205, 209 (1992). At the
conclusion of the training, the eleven mothers with intellectual disabilities were performing the
parenting skills at a higher level than the control group of non-handicapped mothers. Id. at 210.
For more information about Dr. Feldman’s research and approach to assessing parental capacity,
see generally MAURICE FELDMAN & MARJORIE AUNOS, COMPREHENSIVE, COMPETENCEBASED PARENTING ASSESSMENT FOR PARENTS WITH LEARNING DIFFICULTIES AND THEIR
CHILDREN (2011) (providing resources for professionals and presenting an innovative approach
to assessing parental capacity to aid with custody decisions).
247. See Sandra T. Azar & Kristin N. Read, Parental Cognitive Disabilities and Child
Protection Services: The Need for Human Capacity Building, 36 J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 127,
133 (2009).
We believe [child protective services] will be less effective with cases involving
[parents with cognitive disabilities] because of a mis-match of their typical
approaches to what may be the special needs of the parents involved (e.g., a high
reliance on parents orchestrating their own services, time-limited parent education
as the vehicles for change, and traditional service provision, such as
psychotherapy) and residual biases that still exist toward this population.
Id.
248. See Parents with Intellectual Disabilities, THE ARC (Mar. 3, 2011),
https://www.thearc.org/document.doc?id=3659 [https://perma.cc/U23Y-NAWM].
249. DOJ & HSS Letter, supra note 49, at 17.
250. ROCKING THE CRADLE, supra note 65, at 171 (“A study of child welfare evaluations
found that evaluators were largely unable to identify appropriate or adapted interventions for
supporting or strengthening the parenting capacities of people with disabilities.”) (citation
omitted).
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benefit DCF in supporting compliance with its legal obligations under the
ADA. Further clarification of DCF’s obligation under the reasonable
efforts requirement, codified within its own regulations, would also
further help create unity among courts and clarity across the state as to the
scope of this requirement.
E. Additional Proposed Methods to Ensure Adequate Services for
Parents
Even with the recognition that the court has the judicial authority to
order that reasonable efforts be made, what exactly is required remains
largely undefined251 and would have to be decided on a case-by-case basis.
Some states have addressed this issue by providing more concrete
requirements for their child protection agencies to follow when providing
services. For example, in Oregon, the efforts to reunify a family must
have a rational relationship to the reason for the child having been placed
in state custody.252 A clearer indication of the services required under the
reasonable efforts requirement would allow for both DCF and the court to
better evaluate parents’ claims that they are receiving inadequate services.
Clearer agency policy about what services parents with disabilities are
guaranteed under the ADA would also help DCF avoid lawsuits and
investigations and help family defense attorneys advocate for specific
services on behalf of their clients. However, lack of clear definition of
what constitutes reasonable efforts does not eliminate the judicial
responsibility under Chapter 119, Section 29C, to make written findings
of reasonable efforts, nor the authority to order that services be provided.
It is also possible that the definition of reasonable efforts was intended by
the legislature to remain broad, because a factual determination of whether
reasonable efforts were made will depend entirely on the unique factual
circumstances of each case. Regardless, putting the determination of
whether reasonable efforts have been made into the hands of the judiciary
rather than DCF itself would create a necessary check on DCF’s ability to
take custody of children without providing necessary services for parents.
CONCLUSION
The court’s decision in Walt upheld the power of the judiciary to
make specific orders when DCF has been found in violation of the
reasonable efforts requirement.253 This decision extends the scope of
authority held by the juvenile court to include ordering DCF to remedy its
251. O’Brien, supra note 37, at 1054.
252. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 419B.343(1)(a) (West 2018).
253. See supra Section III.A.
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failure to provide reunification services once the child has been
removed.254 As of now, there is no other meaningful enforcement
mechanism for ensuring that adequate reunification services are provided,
and therefore no pressure upon DCF to abide by this statutory
requirement.255
The ability to hold the Department accountable for fulfilling its
statutory obligation is of particular relevance in wake of the Sara Gordon
case and subsequent DOJ and HSS report.256 For parents with intellectual
disabilities, or other disabilities protected under the ADA, it is
fundamental that these clients have a mechanism for timely argument that
their specific needs be accommodated for by DCF in support of
reunification.257 Applying Walt to provide more active judicial review of
services for parents will provide parents with disabilities one way to seek
review of the services they are being offered, and potential redress for
inadequate services. This added avenue of advocacy and protection would
help families reduce the harm associated with a prolonged and
unnecessary separation.

254. Care & Prot. of Walt, 84 N.E.3d 803, 810–811 (Mass. 2017).
255. See supra Section I.D.
256. See Robyn Powell, Federal Agencies Say State Cannot Discriminate Against Parents
(Mar.
1,
2015),
https://www.americanbar.org/
with
Disabilities,
ABA
groups/child_law/resources/child_law_practiceonline/child_law_practice/vol-34/march2015/federal-agencies-say-state-cannot-discriminate-against-parents-w/
[https://perma.cc/7VGM-P7WQ] (“Regrettably, despite the ADA and Section 504’s obvious
application to the child welfare system, state courts and child welfare agencies have continued
to disregard these important laws and their legal obligations.”).
257. Powell, supra note 240, at 144–47 (citing IASSID SIRG, supra note 241, at 301)
(explaining how support services for parents with intellectual disabilities must be tailored to
meet the parents’ learning style, taught in the home, and must “incorporate modelling and
simplified verbal and visual techniques and allow opportunities for practice with feedback and
positive reinforcement”). The specificity of the services required to adequately serve parents
with disabilities can be overlooked when there is not valid avenue to advocate their necessity.

